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This response to Taylor's essay in this issue (p. 17) concludes that his notion of soft 
perennialism is unworkable and shows no promise as a theory to explain spiritual 
diversity. Numerous specific shortcomings of the paper are described, then it is used as 
basis for identifying three broad categories of error that occur in some transpersonal 
scholarship. Examples from Taylor's paper are supplemented with similar errors in 
papers by other transpersonal scholars.
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From its inception transpersonal psychology has been bedeviled by a tension between on the one hand, scientific and scholarly approaches that 
diminish the value of mystical, spiritual, and exceptional 
human experiences, and on the other, uncritical 
speculations invented to support the importance of these 
dimensions of the person. More than one luminary in 
the field has forged a reputation by penning an array of 
popular books with appealing but inadequately or even 
poorly founded notions, typically accompanied by a 
few scholarly articles published in holistically oriented 
psychology journals that give a semblance of credence to 
their work. Given that transpersonal psychology has been 
in a preliminary phase of development in which various 
frameworks and constructs have been tried out, the field 
has rightly given some leeway to these explorations. 
 The pages of transpersonal journals deserve to be 
used to critically vet and winnow these ideas in the process 
of building a field that demonstrates substantive value 
and integrity. Such processes, though less common than 
might be desired, are already present within transpersonal 
scholarship—beginning perhaps in the mid-1990s with 
critiques of Wilber's work (e.g., Ferrer, 1998, 2002, 2009; 
Rothberg & Kelly, 1998; Wright, 1995, 1996). In concert 
with these have been calls for more careful approaches to 
philosophy (e.g., Ferrer, 2002), science (e.g., Friedman, 
2002; MacDonald, 2013; Walach, 2013), and method 
(Berkhin & Hartelius, 2011; Friedman, 2013; Hartelius, 
2007, 2014). The current response to Taylor's paper is 
offered in this constructive critical spirit.
 Taylor's (2016, this issue) essay on soft 
perennialism is a worthy effort to advance the field, even if 
its primary contribution is to illustrate that its particular 
approach is wholly unworkable and shows no future 
promise. There are aspects he gets right, most notably 
his call for basing transpersonal scholarship in empirical, 
phenomenological research rather than philosophy, 
and suggesting that experiences reported as spiritual 
awakening should be compared with quite similar 
accounts of processes that occur outside of spiritual or 
religious contexts. Taylor also noted correctly that a 
number of early transpersonal scholars held perennialist 
views, reviewed relevant critiques of Wilber's (e.g., 
2000) perennialist model, and affirmed observations 
that Wilber's work retains the features of perennialism 
even though Wilber (2006) himself has disavowed some 
aspects of the approach. All of this reflects the presence 
of some critical thought and analysis, which are much 
needed in these areas of study.
 Unfortunately, Taylor has not heeded his 
own advice as he engaged his topic. Instead, he has 
put forward a heavily philosophical and metaphysical 
viewpoint, then twisted and turned to disavow the clearly 
metaphysical nature of his position. He has claimed that 
his is a perennial phenomenology rather than a perennial 
philosophy, yet in his phenomenological research he 
demonstrates a blindness to his own interpretive lens. 
Analysis of qualitative data is a subjective process in 
which the researcher needs to disclose biases in favor 
of particular interpretations, strive to set these biases 
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aside, and perhaps seek review of the analysis by others 
with expertise in either the topic or in qualitative 
research; rather than reporting such disclosures and 
validation procedures in his research (Taylor, 2012a, 
2012b), Taylor (2016) has instead claimed that evidence 
for his pre-existing opinions emerged naturally out 
of the phenomenological data. This is an alarmingly 
unreflective claim that places even the validity of his 
empirical work in serious question.  
 Equally disquieting is Taylor's opinion that 
only a perennialist theory can account for similarities 
of experience between individuals in different cultural 
contexts. This seems to belie a lack of acquaintance 
with basic notions of psychology, namely that a woman 
in rural Kentucky may experience loneliness in a way 
that is quite resonant with how it is felt by a woman 
who works in a high government position in Kuala 
Lumpur, because humans share quite similar DNA and 
physiology. An explanation that relies on neuroscience 
and phenomenology rather than on belief in some sort of 
pervasive consciousness that is claimed to be the basis of 
all existence, seems both more parsimonious and more 
credible. 
 Rather than focusing solely on the limitations 
of Taylor's paper, what may be of greater value is to 
consider three types of problematic assumption and 
argument that appear within it, and illustrate how these 
also occur in writings of other transpersonal scholars. 
In this way, Taylor's work may serve as a sort of primer 
for somewhat common fallacies and limitations in 
transpersonal scholarship. 
Out of Thin Air:
Metaphysical Assertions 
A common problem in transpersonal scholarship is the presence of unacknowledged metaphysical 
concepts. Some such instances are obvious. For example, 
it is clear to any fair reader that Wilber's (e.g., 2000, 
2006) notion of a nondual ultimate is metaphysical. 
The nondual is by Wilber's definition the ultimate 
source of all reality, the paper upon which any form is 
written (Wilber, 2006). As such, it is beyond any of its 
manifestations such as sense experience or a mind that 
might perceive such experience. Such an ultimate would 
seem by definition to be transcendent beyond any formal 
method that might wish to verify its presence.  
 Yet Wilber's nondual is metaphysical not 
because it is transcendent—that is, beyond conventional 
physical reality—it is metaphysical because Wilber 
has made an unfalsifiable claim about the ultimate 
nature of reality. The term metaphysical derives from 
meta ta physica, referring to one of Aristotle’s works 
that speculated on being, existence, and first principles 
(Gifford, 2015)—in other words, on the true nature of 
reality. A more common contemporary understanding 
is that metaphysics refers to subjects that cannot be 
examined scientifically. Wilber's nondual is metaphysical 
in both of these senses.  
 While a nondual ultimate is difficult to 
imagine, let alone experience, metaphysical claims can 
also be made about physical objects, or about sensate 
experiences. A claim that the Empire State Building is 
the tallest building in New York City is demonstrably 
false; a claim that it is at the center of the universe is a 
metaphysical claim because there is no way to determine 
whether or not this is the case. The fact that the building 
can be seen and touched and ascended by elevator 
does not in any way lessen the metaphysical nature of 
this claim, for in order to be true this implies that the 
universe must have a finite, measurable size, and that 
it must be centered on New York City. While few New 
Yorkers would dispute the latter point, both are claims 
about the cosmos that are untestable. 
 Other authors such as Taylor (2016) and 
Blackstone (2006) have similarly inserted metaphysical 
claims about the nature of reality. For example, Taylor's 
(2016) model proposes that there is an 
all-pervading spiritual force that constitutes the 
essence of one's being and of everything else that 
exists. ... 
 Spiritual experiences occur ... when one 
transcends the separateness and automatized 
perception of one's normal state of being, and 
experiences a world that is radiantly alive with spirit-
force, and sense that one shares their being with 
everything around and with the force itself. (p. 34)
Taylor seems to believe that because this force is 
immanent rather than transcendent, and linked to 
sensate experience, that his claim is not a metaphysical 
one. Yet the claim that a pervasive spirit-force constitutes 
the essence of reality is a metaphysical assertion, whether 
or no Taylor intends it to be so. One might collect reports 
from individuals who have experienced the world as if it 
is radiantly alive with spirit-force, but even if this spirit-
force could be measured, this would not be evidence 
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that spirit-force is the essence of one's being or of all the 
world. 
 A notably similar claim has been made by 
Blackstone (2006) regarding
the experience of a subtle, all-pervasive expanse of 
consciousness pervading one’s internal and external 
experience as a unified whole. The Asian teachings 
that describe this type of nondual experience 
consider this subtle consciousness to be the essence 
of being. (p. 27)
In recent published dialogue with Blackstone (2016, 
this issue), she has stated that "I do not claim in my 
writing or teaching to understand either the nature of 
consciousness or the structure of reality. I do not teach 
a philosophy or a metaphysical system." However that 
may be, the suggestion that a subtle experience of 
pervasive nondual consciousness is the essence of being 
is, as with Wilber and Taylor, an unfalsifiable assertion 
about the founational nature of reality—and as such it is 
a metaphysical assertion. 
 It is probably not possible to remove all 
metaphysical assumptions from any context, including 
science. However, these are particularly problematic when 
they are unconscious, unacknowledged, or even denied, 
and especially when they are central to a particular idea 
or line of argument. Transpersonal scholars would do 
well to gain a clear understanding of what metaphysical 
assumptions look like, to identify them when they are 
used, to offer some explanation for why a metaphysical 
stance seems called for or perhaps unavoidable in a given 
context, and to acknowledge the vulnerabilities inherent 
in metaphysical claims.
Slippery Equivalency:
Conflating Experienced States 
with Metaphysical Claims
A closely related problem concerns the conflation of experiential states with statements about what those 
experiences are supposed to mean. A personal anecdote 
may serve to illustrate the issue.
 When I was in my twenties, I went by myself to 
a local holistic fair. A man in one of the exhibit booths 
sat at a bare table wearing odd yellow-hued goggles. His 
appearance and the fact that he did not seem to have 
any product to sell piqued my curiosity. He told me he 
taught people how to soul travel, and invited me to a free 
class that was to take place a couple of weeks later. When 
I arrived at the class there were perhaps twenty others, 
many of whom seemed to be regular students. We went 
through an induction, then sat quietly with eyes closed, 
observing whatever images appeared in imagination. 
Then each person took a turn sharing what they saw. 
One individual said she saw herself as a blue ball, with 
other blue balls around her, and there was a golden ball 
that came over and pricked her. "That means I am your 
teacher," the man with the yellow goggles informed her. 
Over the next half hour I figured out that this man was 
likely making a six-figure income running nightly classes 
in his home and interpreting the imagery of suggestible 
individuals. I did not return. 
 When a person is told that if they have such-
and-such experience, it means some particular thing, 
then if they have that experience, they may simply accept 
without question that it means what they have been 
told it means. Yet an experience in and of itself has no 
particular meaning; it is context that provides meaning. 
The same epithet may have a very different impact if it is 
shouted by a police officer with a gun, or if it is screamed 
from the stage by a comedian. 
 Wilber's work (e.g., 2006) can be taken to 
mean that the nondual is the ultimate reality, and that a 
nondual state of consciousness is a direct and confirming 
experience of this ultimate reality. Yet even in a simple 
embodied state the conventional divide between subject 
and object is shifted, softened, even dissolved (Hartelius, 
2015a; Hartelius & Goleman, 2016); such an experience 
need not be taken to mean that one has touched ultimate 
reality or the essence of existence, or anything other 
than a moderately shifted state of mind. Experiencing a 
state that could be described as nondual does not affirm 
Wilber's intuition about the structure of the cosmos. 
 Taylor (2016) has a similar approach, claiming 
that the all-pervading spiritual force "is not a metaphysical 
speculation, but can be experienced  as a tangible reality" 
(p. 31). Here a slippery equivalency is made between a 
particular experience and a particular metaphysical 
claim. Allegedly, if one feels some quality of presence 
through oneself and one's surroundings, then this means 
that there is an all-pervading spiritual force that is the 
essence of being. Of course, an experience of this type 
may be valued, but it does not necessarily mean any such 
thing about the essence of being.
 Blackstone (2006) has made a quite similar 
claim, suggesting that feeling consciousness as a subtle 
pervasive expanse of space in and around the body 
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represents realizing nondual consciousness as one's own 
nature. Here again a specific phenomenal experience is 
taken as evidence for a particular metaphysical claim 
about the nature of reality, which is entirely unwarranted. 
(For a more detailed discussion see the Editor's Response 
in Blackstone, 2016 [this issue]). 
 An additional example of highly questionable 
equivalency is Forman (1999)—cited by Taylor (2016)—
who has claimed that experiences in which awareness 
has no object reflect pure consciousness, and has suggested 
that these events may provide evidence of a Wilber-style 
ultimate reality. Yet such experiences could just as easily 
be termed empty consciousness, which offers quite different 
connotations. Here again, there is a bold assertion that a 
particular kind of experience validates some metaphysical 
claim about reality. In fact many other interpretations 
of such experiences are also possible, and metaphysical 
claims remain undemonstrable.
 Perhaps consciousness is the source and fabric 
of reality; this possibility cannot be denied or disproven. 
Indeed, some have claimed that a kind of pervasive 
nonlocal consciousness may be the only way to explain 
various human capacities (e.g., Schwartz, 2015). Yet 
other explanations may still emerge—and even if it were 
possible to demonstrate that nonlocal consciousness does 
somehow extend through space, this does not mean that 
consciousness is the primary fabric of reality, nor that 
it extends through all of the universe. Furthermore, the 
ability of conscious to extend over distances would not 
mean that the experience of something that seems to 
be presence or consciousness in the space around one's 
body is actually the same phenomenon that extends over 
distances, rather than something else more local to the 
person. 
 Even more central is the fact that in a context 
where critical thinking is applied, a personal experience 
cannot be used to validate a metaphysical claim. When 
such a claim is advanced together with the advertisement 
that "you can feel it for yourself," the "it" that can be 
felt is not proof of the metaphysical claim. As noted, 
the fact that one can physically experience the Empire 
State Building is not evidence for a claim that it is at 
the center of the universe.  The simple yet notable shifts 
in state of consciousness that occur when the experience 
of conscious attending drops down from the head into 
the body (Hartelius & Goleman, 2016), while likely 
beneficial, should not be reified or obscured by outsized 
claims about their meaning.
 
Leading the Witness:
Improper Use of Sources
Wilber has been repeatedly criticized for appropriating a wide variety of ideas without 
crediting his sources; however, this issue is well enough 
established that it deserves no more than passing mention 
here. With Taylor (2016) the issue is use of inadequate 
sources, and with Blackstone (2006) there is uncritical 
interpretation of textual material.
 One of Taylor's (2016) arguments for his soft 
perennialism is that Ferrer's participatory thought is too 
relativistic to account for similarities between spiritual 
traditions. Participatory models are relational rather than 
relativistic, but since even relativism puts no bounds 
on possibilities for similarity, what Taylor may have 
meant is that if there are significant similarities, only a 
perennialist approach provides a satisfactory meaning 
frame. While arguments based on personal preference for 
certain explanations generally do not carry great weight, 
the issue here is that in order to demonstrate how similar 
awakening experiences are among a variety of traditions, 
Taylor (2016) has cited a very few authors such as 
Spencer, Stace, Eliade, Levy-Bruhl, Turnbull, Underhill, 
Happold, and Suzuki, who, through their sympathetic 
ideological leanings, have already interpreted their data 
through a homogenizing lens that fits with Taylor's 
thinking—an inadequate basis for evidence because the 
sources consulted confirm the biases of the author.
  For Blackstone (2006), the concern is that she 
has relied on translations of textual materials from several 
different traditions, and then compared these with each 
other and with her own experiential descriptions. Even 
descriptions from another contemporary culture need 
to be considered within their own context in order to 
ensure that a Western scholar's understanding of them 
is accurate. When the source of description is translated 
ancient texts from another culture, what appears to be 
a description of experience may instead be metaphor or 
poetic language, or even esoteric symbolism. Without 
careful attention to obtaining an appropriate and critical 
translation, and review by a scholar knowledgeable 
in the particular text and culture, opportunities for 
misinterpretation are too many to disregard. (For a more 
detailed discussion see Hartelius, 2015b).
 The work of Wilber, Taylor, and Blackstone 
all contain ideas and descriptions worthy of attention. 
However, when scholarly sources are omitted, or selected 
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or used without proper care, the credibility of the 




Scientific skeptics are often all too ready to dismiss reports of exceptional human capacities and 
experiences as irrational belief. Those in more holistic 
approaches to psychology, on the other hand, may be too 
ready to accept metaphysical assertions, to believe that 
some experiential state is evidence for such assertions, 
or to rely on substandard means for gathering evidence 
to support such ideas. Just as healthy skepticism should 
not imply prejudice or rejection, so sympathetic curiosity 
should not imply uncritical acceptance. 
  The errors illustrated here are not the only ones 
found in transpersonal scholarship, but they reflect failings 
that occur more frequently than ought to be the case in the 
literature of the field. The purpose of pointing out these 
issues is encouragement toward more careful scholarship 
and better research, rather than censure. As with any 
scholarly field, a balance should be found between allowing 
multiple, innovative, and sometimes unorthodox voices to 
speak, and identifying inadequacies in scholarship that 
could be remedied with additional care. 
 Taylor's (2016) soft perennialism is a notion 
that likely has too many inadequacies to be of any real 
use other than perhaps as a metaphor of how participants 
in various spiritual traditions might be thought of as 
exploring different parts of a shared landscape. This 
metaphor does not translate well into psychological 
theory, and it is unfortunate that Taylor's ideas were 
not vetted more carefully before being disseminated as 
a popular book. Those with advanced degrees, and the 
credibility these degrees confer, have a responsibility to 
educate their public readers carefully, rather than using 
public forums to advance ideas that may be appealing to a 
popular audience but lacking in the soundness that might 
give them enduring value. 
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